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PRESENTATION 
 
 
 
Written at a time of continuing upheaval and rapid changes the paper presented has the 
aim to provide an overview and an attempt of critical analysis of a framework unequally 
comprehensive in its coverage and legally binding in nature has replaced in time the 
coerced colonial relationships which formally linked some of these countries. 
In particular it is widely explained through a background history how an international 
organization such as the EU responded to the geo-political change. 
As it is explained fully in the paper presented the EU’s relationship with the former 
colonies conclude that it rests on three main supports: 
1. legacy of colonialsm  some of which is positive, for familiarity does not only breed 
contempt, it can foster understanding and mutual respect 
2. a belief in the complementarity of the two blocs, one temperate, the other tropical, one 
natural resource rich, the other skill-intensive, one densely populated, the other 
urbanized  
3. the assertion that Europe has more to offer in terms of culture, the “benevolent” 
promotion of development , disinterested assistance and political cooperation  than the 
newer, brasher super-powers ever could. 
 
Closer scrutiny show definite flaws in their construction. 
Development was therefore theorised as a process of societal convergence between 
hierarchically conceptualised state-societies (rich- poor, developed-undervedevoped). 
In this theorisation the state is seen as the accepted engine of growth. 
The argument is therefore that mainstream economic development theory is simply a 
branch of Western Economics  and such European centred. 
The failure of this theory  brought therefore a critique of top-down approaches, the 
disparagement of big government and the state and thus made way for “bottom up” 
intervention that are concerned  with the vulnerability of the poor and that aim to 
strengthen local structures and empower the local communities. 
The conclusion of this sorry tale of the West’s present relations with former colonies is that 
there is an emerging system of global governance with methods and instruments geared to 
containing and managing symptoms rather than removing the causes. 
The lack of political will to remove such caused attests to a process of disengagement from 
the periphery of the world economy. 
 
 
President of Board of administrators 
                 Mario Santoro 
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ABSTRACT 
 
In the current trend of geopolitical, societal and institutional changes, which are occurring 
in most world economies, the EU development cooperation policies may be confronted 
with a need to critically revise their very definition.  
This paper proposes an overview of the cooperation initiatives, which have recently been 
undertaken by the EU. Besides accounting for their evolution an effort is made to sharp the 
understanding of their underlying fundaments, as far as the future issues of cooperative 
development are concerned. One major finding is that an increase of complexity in 
cooperation programs is occurring as manifested in a widening of the scopes, an increase in 
the number of eligible actors and a more diversified structure of relationships. 
A few major aspects likely to play an important role in the future cooperation initiatives are 
identified, concerning: a) a re-definition of the EU-ACP cooperation developmental issues, 
b) the contrasting trends of decentralization and globalisation, c) a refinement in our ways 
of thinking about and approaching the definition of cooperative actions. 
 
Key Words: cooperative actions, EU development cooperation, interdependencies, 
partnership, agents’ cognitive abilities   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
As a number of socioeconomic, technological and institutional changes are sweeping over 
the EU, not least the current process of EU enlargement, international cooperation policies 
amongst the member states are likely to be significantly affected. 
To investigate some aspects of the transformations which are occurring or may be 
expected, an examination of the evolution that EU cooperation underwent since the 
launching of its early programs in the sixties is carried out. This endeavour, in fact, may 
prove to be a useful exercise for analysing: 
• the advances made by the EU cooperation programs as the EU unification progressed 
and the institutional setting of cooperation modified; 
• the leverage that cooperation initiatives can provide as far as issues of sustainable 
socio-economic development are concerned for both EU and non-EU states. 
The history of EU cooperation policy covers a relatively short time span, but has been 
marked by some major events, commonly referred to as Conventions. 
The earlier were the Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969 between the EU and African 
and Malagasy states1. They represented a first attempt by the EU to manage the transition 
from a colonial to neo colonial relationship, by establishing a set of formalized inter-
regional relationships. These were substantially expanded in the early 1970s’ by the 
accession of Britain in the EU and the pushing demands by the existing and potential 
‘associates’ for a redefinition of the terms of the relationship. 
This paved the way to the most significant and extensive events represented by the Lomé 
Convention, which developed over more than fifteen years. It was a very elaborate regime 
defining rules, regulations and arrangements concerning trade and aid relations. The 
Convention was first signed in 1975 and was renewed 3 times. Lomè IV was signed in 1989 
and revised in 1995. The number of countries also progressively increased, from 9 to 15 to 
46 to the 71 states, involving countries from the Caribbean and Pacific coasts (the ACP 
states). As Lomè IV came into an end in 2000, a far-reaching recasting of the 
institutionalised relationship was undertaken with the creation of a new Partnership 
Agreement between the same groups of states.  
In the Cotonou Convention, in June 2000, the representatives of over 80 states put their 
seal on an agreement designed to govern development co-operation between the EU and 
ACP countries for the next 20 years. It marks the beginning of a new era in the relations 
between the North and the South of the World (see Brown, 2002). 
Our analysis will take as a background the evolution in the EU-ACP relationships and seeks 
to sharp the understanding of their underlying fundaments, as far as the future issues of 
cooperative development are concerned. 
In this direction, in the first part of the paper we put forward   few arguments, which will 
serve as a guide for our analysis. In Section 2 we hint at some major conceptual questions 
involved in defining cooperative situations. A kind of framework is outlined and some 
general notions to be used in the analysis of the EU-ACP relationships are identified. 
Studies on international developmental cooperation for the European countries are 
extensive and a number of approaches have been proposed for its interpretation. In the 
second part of the paper (Section 3) we will recall the main approaches, which have been 
                                                 
1 The Yaoundè Agreements established the EU as a key player in determining the nature of relations between 
Europe and the former colonial territories of Africa. The new relationship of ‘association’  bore many of the 
hallmarks of the new international norms, recognition of formal independence and equality with the ex-
colonies. 
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developed in the literature and review their contribution in the light of the key notions 
suggested in Section 2. From the overview, a kind of blurred picture is exposed, in which 
the acknowledged unsatisfactory outcome of most EU-ACP programs of the past, has to 
confront with a range of new issues which are raised by changes in both the geopolitical, 
i.e. the EU enlargement, and institutional contexts, i.e. the new possibilities for cooperation 
recently introduced at sub national level (the so called decentralised cooperation), and the 
determinations enacted on a global scale by world institutions (i.e. the recommendations of 
the WTO). 
Finally, in the last part of the paper an attempt is made to focus on a number of questions, 
which may be challenging in the future EU international developmental cooperation 
policies and thinking. Building on the acknowledged need of a modern view of cooperation 
in the XXI century, we argue that three points may deserve prior attention: a) the notion of 
development and its implication as far as capacity development for socioeconomic weaker 
countries is concerned, b) the changing societal background and the resulting institutional 
impact which may be produced on the forms of cooperation between states and sub-
national states at both the international and sub-national levels and c) the importance of 
agents’ ability to share a common view on both the goals and kind of partnership required 
in cooperation. 
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2. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATIVE ACTION 
 
 
2.1 Introductory remarks 
 
In human organizations cooperative activities are not just out there to be discovered, 
implemented and given institutional legitimization. They are built up in a co-evolutionary 
process in which social actions are supported by cognitive awareness, underlying individual, 
collective and institutional behaviours, which inscribe in and are shaped by an evolving 
environment. 
Central to this view is a notion of homo sapiens, whose behaviour is guided by a set of 
learning strategies and environmental constraints (Bowles and Gintis, 2002, Gintis, 2002). 
These latter refer to a quite heterogeneous mix, i.e., language, traditions, cultural capital, 
conventional wisdom, cognitive strategy, which comes into play whenever we act in a 
complex world. 
In this view, there are two fundamental streams of ideas: 
• in the first, which we can call bottom up view, cooperation is a particular form of 
interaction, which ‘occurs when two or more agents are brought together into a 
dynamic relationship through a set of reciprocal actions’ (Ferber, 1999, p. 59). More 
specifically, an agent is a social (cognitive) agent, whose actions are goal-oriented and 
based on an internally explicit representational attitude towards the world. For example, 
if as in Ferber (1999, p. 17) we distinguish agents according to their representational 
ability of the world (i.e. reactive vs. cognitive) and their type of behaviour (i.e. reflexive 
vs. goal oriented) different kinds of agent can be a defined, i.e. intelligent, drive-based, 
module-based and tropistic agent. As a result of the variability in the agency profile, 
different cooperative situations are likely to emerge from the interactions between 
individual agents. As a general prerequisite for cooperation a situation of conflict 
avoidance or conflict resolution should exist, as incompatibility between interfering 
goals is a major barrier to cooperation;  
• in the second, cooperation is a form of systemic relationships, which has been 
established for a group of individuals having different roles, given a certain set of 
norms and rules governing the functioning of the system. This suggests a top-down 
view of cooperation and stems from a systemic approach of society and human 
organization2. For the systemic view, therefore, cooperation is a situation resulting from 
                                                 
2 When looking at the main drives of cooperation, literature provides us with three major perspectives of 
analysis (see Bowles and Gintis, 2002, Maynard Smith and Szathmary, 1995): 
• the first views individuals as social animals. Cooperation results from a basic desire of helping a relative 
in order to propagate one’s own genes (kin selected altruism). Individuals therefore would manifest an 
intrinsic attitude to socialize, through mechanisms such as altruism and reciprocity;   
• the second views individuals as self-interested. Cooperation, then, is primarily associated with mutual 
benefits to be gained by grouping. Synergetic effects are involved, which depend on both the type of 
strategy individuals are likely to undertake (i.e. that of the prisoner’s dilemma) and the stability of the 
adopted strategy; 
• the last perspective views individuals as bounded actors in a society, which imposes norms and collective 
rules on them. Cooperation is made possible by means of a kind of social contract, which punishes who 
will defect. 
In real world situations, none of the above views is likely to be predominant, but all may come into play 
although in different ways or at different times in the evolution of the system as the configuration of the 
cultural landscape is also changing. In addition, the increasing pace of innovation and spreading of new 
information technologies in all sectors of cities as well as in society (Janelle and Hodge eds., 2000), make it 
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the interplay of actors’ interactions, given the existing set of system relationships  (i.e. 
norms, institutional rules, customs) and/or the action of an external event, i.e. a policy 
prescription, which can constrain, foster or favour the realization of cooperative 
situations.  
Neither the bottom up nor the top down view alone has proven to be successful in 
providing adequate answers to cooperation. It is increasingly acknowledged that both are 
involved and need to be integrated in a common approach to cooperation.  
Some authors have pointed out that besides recognizing that cooperation emerges from 
intelligent interacting agents, we have to admit that agents are social (see Castelfranchi, 
1998a, Conte 2000). In particular, sociality means that agents share a common world, 
characterized by interferences among the agents’ actions and goals. 
Interferences, on their turn, are context dependent as they depend on the environment in 
which they take place. But this latter is not simply a passive playground underlying the 
organizational structure, i.e. the system of dependence relationships, which bounds the 
agents’ capabilities. It can itself be viewed as an agent, belonging to a higher systemic level, 
embodying a group of individual agents interacting at a lower level. 
To which extent this collective agent is likely to be endowed with intelligence, which kind 
of intelligence will he/she possess and how his/her various forms of intelligence may, on 
their turn, affect individual agents’ intelligence are a few research questions which are raised 
in several fields of social analysis.  
Literature suggests three major perspectives, which can be helpful, as far as the possibilities 
to articulate the social potentialities of human interactions are concerned: 
• the first concerns the tension between what is to be considered as good for an 
individual and a group. Cooperation between self-interested reciprocating individuals is 
associated with mutual benefits to be gained by grouping. Synergetic effects are 
involved, which depend on both the type of strategy individuals are likely to undertake 
(i.e. that of the prisoner’s dilemma) and the stability of the adopted strategy (see 
Axelrod, 1997); 
• the second builds upon a notion of homo socialis and relates to the idea of social capital, 
which is created because of the web of relationships established by heterogeneous 
agents interacting in a certain milieu. This yields a systemic component which endows 
the milieu of a mix of resources which can be successfully spent to sustain its 
developmental path and management performance (see, Pierce, Lovrich and Moon, 
2002); 
• the last and more recent view recognizes that a human being is a homo sapiens (see 
Bowles and Gintis, 2002). His behaviour depends on a conceptual blending (Hutchins, 
1998) between his own cognitive abilities and the intangible asset of system 
endowments marking his cultural environment, i.e. language, norms, traditions, customs, 
know-how, collective practices. Besides playing a role in constraining or favouring the 
deployment of agents’ relationships, cultural environment is thus an essential 
component of their milieu which co-evolves with the other socio-economic, 
environmental, institutional components of any human organization (see Gabora, 
1997). 
Of course, the development of an integrated approach to cooperation would require a 
broader research project capable of articulating both the contents of the questions we are 
addressing, i.e. the type of cooperative situations we are interested in, and the 
                                                                                                                                               
possible to establish  new forms of interactions which can trigger, favour or amplify the possibility to realize 
cooperative actions. 
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epistemological framework we consider for their analysis, i.e. the way we approach those 
situations3. 
As a first step in this direction, in the following we will outline a kind of conceptual 
framework, which will also serve as reference for the analysis of the EU-ACP relationships 
in Section 3. 
 
 
2.2 A framework of cooperative situations  
 
In structuring a framework of cooperative situations the articulation between the two levels 
on which cooperation is rooted, i.e. the individual, cooperation emerges as a result of the 
behaviour of individual interacting agents, and the collective, i.e. cooperative actions 
depend on the set of systemic relationships impinging on individuals’ behaviours, is a major 
aspect. 
In particular, we suggest that two main dimensions should underlie the framework: 
• an internal dimension, which refers to the individual cognitive ability and concerns the 
kind of attitude agents have towards the world (see Castelfranchi, 1998a, Ferber, 1999). 
Two extreme situations can be identified:  
o  that in which agents have a limited cognitive ability of the external world, i.e. 
they only take into account their own view and can simply react to stimuli from 
the environment and /or comply with the others’ behaviours in a reactive way; 
o  that in which agents have a more complex cognitive ability, i.e. they take into 
also the other’s agent point-of-view, and can influence their external world, 
affecting both their environment, the behaviours of other agents an the other’s 
agents views; 
• an external dimension, which accounts for the structure of dependences (the system of 
relationships) and defines agents’ roles within their organizational context. It also gives 
the general set of socioeconomic, spatial, cultural and institutional conditions, which 
endow and/or constrain agents’ aims, resources and tasks (see Caldas and Coelho, 
2000). Also for this dimension, we can identify two extreme cases:  
o  a simple dependence in which only the role of certain agents prevails (it is 
recognized as predominant) in the systemic relationships;  
o  an inter-dependence in which the different roles of the various agents are 
accounted-for in the system relationships (i.e. their complementarities are 
acknowledged). 
o  These two dimensions allow us to identify an ideal space within which a whole 
range of cooperative situations can be accommodated.  
To sharpen our argument, it may be worth considering as an example the taxonomy of 
cooperative situations developed by Schaeffer and Loveridge (2002). Although the 
taxonomy refers to a specific type of cooperation, i.e. the public-private cooperation, it is 
particularly exemplary, because it is based on a set of possible definitional keys for defining 
                                                 
3 For example, some questions to be addressed are the following (Occelli, 2002): 
• is cooperation to be considered embedded in the intentional posture of the agent, thus resulting in 
his/her commitment to some higher-level system goals, which drive any social activity? 
• is cooperation to be viewed as the outcome of some secondary feedback effects resulting from agent’s 
interactions, which would affect the functioning of the system while being no intention driven? 
(Castelfranchi, 2001); 
• to which extent can cooperation be thought as being driven by some anticipatory concern about the 
future state of the system? 
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cooperation, which turn out to be pertinent also for our discussion. These definitional keys 
are related to: 
• the purpose, i.e. what are the aims of the agents in participating to cooperation? 
• the expected outcome, i.e. what are the benefits and costs of the cooperation for the 
participating agents? How are they shared and/or supported? 
• the agreement between agents, i.e. what kind of arrangements is defined for the agents 
to commit themselves to cooperation? 
• the duration, i.e. what is the temporal deployment of the cooperative situation? Do 
agents learn about cooperation as the agreement progresses in time? 
• the agents’ decision-making process, i.e. how and to which extents agents are willing to 
participate to cooperation initiatives, define common goals, and commit themselves to 
the cooperation purposes? 
The four ideal types of cooperation, which have been identified according to these keys, are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1   Types of cooperation (adapted from Schaeffer and Loveridge, 2002, p.184) 
 Leader-follower Buyer / Seller Joint-Venture Partnership 
Purpose Specific Specific Specific Broad, open ended 
Outcome 
Individual rewards 
and correlated 
limited risks 
Market conditioned 
individual rewards and 
negotiated risks 
Shared correlated 
rewards and unevenly 
distributed but 
depending on 
agreement conditions 
risks 
Shared rewards and 
unevenly distributed 
but strongly correlated 
risks 
Agreement Depends on the leader 
Depends on 
complexity of 
transaction 
Yes Yes 
Duration  Limited Limited but depending on the purpose 
Depends on 
complexity of the 
project 
Open ended 
Decision-
making  
Independent / 
conditional 
Negociated, 
competitive Coordinated Joint, egalitarian 
 
 
Given its conceptual underpinnings, we can observe that the taxonomy outlined in Tab. 1 
looks at cooperation adopting a substantially external (systemic) point of view.  
Only the decision-making criteria more clearly reflect the internal (individual) view. To 
address agents’ decision-making, in fact, means to recognize that the achievement of a 
cooperative situation depends on agents’ cognitive abilities. In other words, agent’s 
representational (i.e. the agents’ beliefs) and conative (i.e. agents’ tendencies for action) 
functions are essential components for establishing a cooperative situation. These, in fact, 
not only provide the substantial contents of the purpose of cooperation (i.e. the reasons 
why to cooperate) but also give sense to the individual agents for their involvement thus 
contributing to reinforce their commitment and eventually favour the likely positive effects, 
which are expected. 
These remarks are particularly meaningful for the ‘partnership type’ whose general notion 
has gained increasing attention also in the literature on international development 
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cooperation where it has been highlighted as an encompassing feature of the most recent 
relationships between the EC and ACP states4.  
In this context, it has already been clearly underlined that the ways objectives of 
partnership are perceived (in particular by southern states) will influence its success and 
effectiveness (Mohiddin, 1998).  
To go a step further in our discussion, it may be worth wondering how the four types of 
cooperative situations refer to the internal (agents’ attitude towards the world) and external 
(roles of the agent) dimensions of the framework we introduced earlier.  
Fig. 1 shows the graphical result of this exercise. What the figure suggests is that the 
different types may correspond to steps of an ideal trajectory, which moves: 
• from relatively simple cooperative situations, in which agents possess a relatively 
limited cognitive ability and their relationships are prevailing unidirectional, such as 
those represented by the leader/follower, buyer seller types,  
• to relatively more complex ones, where agents’ cognitive abilities are more elaborate 
and their relationships more interdependent and articulated, such as those exemplified 
by the joint venture and partnership types. As far partnership in international 
cooperation is concerned, in particular, some authors (Hauck and Land, 2000) have 
emphasized the higher order form of this relationship. Its saliency depends on the 
specific intertwining of characteristics pertaining to both the internal and external 
dimensions, i.e. long term shared responsibility, common visions, reciprocal 
obligations, mutuality of balance and power and equality of decision-making. Trust, in 
particular, is a further feature, which has been highlighted for the building social capital 
and promoting economic development (see Fukuyama,  1995). 
A final remark about the ideal trajectory of the cooperative situations of Fig. 1, is that 
cooperation cannot be understood as a static state of affairs, i.e. the one shot achievement 
of interacting agents, but as an evolutionary situation, in which also the various forces 
which may drive or constrain its realization belong to an evolving socioeconomic and 
institutional environment.  
                                                 
4 The meaning of “partnership” among sovereign states has long been a subject of some perplexity, given the 
number of widely different international partnerships in operation (see Lister 1988, Raffer 2002). 
Nevertheless, the usage of this terminology is virtually universal today, having flourished, for example in the 
EU’s lexicon, ever since it replaced “Association” to designate  EU relations with developing countries. 
At present “partnership” can be applied to almost any inter-state relations. The dissemination of the 
contemporary discourse of interstate “partnership” is a part of the process of globalisation. 
Adjectives such as “uneven”, “unequal” or “asymmetrical” can be added to “partnership” to indicate its often 
unbalanced nature in practice. Raffer (2001) talks for instance about an “Orwellian model of partnership” 
where the stronger party makes all the decisions and the weaker one is largely a historical burden.  
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Figure 1 Ideal-types of cooperative situations according to the internal an external dimensions 
underlying the relationships between agents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This has already been clearly emphasized on a conceptual and methodological ground by a 
number of studies, which have explored this issue by means of simulation experiments (see 
Cohen, Riolo and Axelrod, 1998).  
 
Internal dimension
 
External dimension
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agent A  takes into other 
agents' reasoning about B's 
behaviour  (goals, actions) 
Simple cognitive abiliity: 
agent A takes into account 
only his own reasoning 
about agent B's behaviour 
(goals, actions)
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towards other 
agents' 
behaviours
Roles of the 
agents 
Dependence:either A's or B's role 
is involved. Uni-directional 
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agents A and B
Inter-dependence: both A's and 
B's roles are involved. Bi-
directional relationships exist 
between agents A and B
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3. AN ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION 
 
 
The aim of this section is to give an account of the evolution of the relationships between 
the EU and ACP states, on the basis of the key notions previously introduced. 
Our attention will focus on the Lomè Conventions, which, as previously mentioned, 
represented fundamental events in the evolution of North South relations and 
development co-operation. In fact, they established a very elaborate regime defining rules, 
regulations and arrangements concerning trade and aid relations between Northern 
developed and Southern underdeveloped countries They took place in the context of a 
historical transformation in which state sovereignty replaced subjugation and colonialism as 
the ordering principles of the relations between the continents of Europe and Africa. 
In the following paragraphs we first present a brief outline of the Lomé Conventions, we 
then outline a general background for their understanding and finally recall the main 
approaches that in the literatures have been provided for their interpretation. 
 
 
3.1 The Lomè Conventions 
 
The Lomè Conventions sat at the apex of a ‘pyramid’ of EU agreements with developing 
countries (Mishalani et al. 1981). Although the EU has had a range of such agreements for 
some time5, those established by the Loma Conventions were the most comprehensive and 
dominated EU relations with the countries of Africa, Caribbean and Pacific islands (the 
ACP states).  
In fact they established a legally binding agreement which (see Brown, 2002):          
• covered the provision of aid to the ACPs; 
• regulated the preferential trade access to EU markets; 
• stabilisation of export earning of the ACPs (via the Stabex system)6; 
• defined a commitment to deal with a whole range of development co-operation issues. 
They also contained mechanisms and institutions for ‘joint administration’ of the 
agreement, as well as for periodic ‘dialogue’ between the parties on its implementation. 
While the original convention responded to a general pattern of North-South relations, 
involving commitments from the EU but also from ACPs countries, it also reflected a more 
specific concern of the ACP for a reformed relationship with the international economy 
and, on the EU side, concerns over raw material supplies and its future relations with the 
South. 
These issues remained but declined in importance as the Convention evolved and as 
North-South relations moved to a new phase in the 1980s. This focussed on an 
increasingly conditional offer of development cooperation from northern states in 
particular, demanding economic and subsequently political reforms in return of aid. 
The Convention thus came to reflect this agenda incorporating such economic and political 
conditionality in terms (i.e. Structural Adjustment of the World Bank and IMF). 
The EU-APC relationships are thus notable in that: 
                                                 
5 These included association and cooperation agreements with countries of the Mediterranean and Middle 
East, covering trade, financial and aid relations. There were also a variety of agreements with Latin American 
countries and Asia. The Lomé Conventions, however, were the most extensive and somehow ‘sat the tone’ 
for the EU policies in agreement with the rest of the developing world lower down the ‘pyramid’. 
6 Stabex: system of tariff preferences which give ACPs countries a special fund to maintain price stability in 
agricultural products. 
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• from an economic point-of view, they do not constitute a common market, free trade 
area or a political alliance, although elements of all are included, i.e. they provide a trade 
regime and political issues are raised by the ‘dialogue’; 
• from an organizational point-of-view, they are based on formalized negotiated 
agreements rather than on a series of ad hoc agreements over aid programmes defined 
by member states through bilateral aid relationship;  
• from an institutional point-of-view, they are enacted by sovereign states on the basis of 
legal equality of the parties. 
 
 
3.2 A background interpretation to the Lomè Conventions 
 
A number of studies have been carried out to analyse the Lomè Conventions. These have 
polarized around two rather different views, which for the sake of simplicity we will call the 
Liberal and Dependency view. 
 
3.2.1   The Liberal view 
 
The Liberal approach to the analysis of Lomè sustained that the signing of the original 
Convention represented a step away from colonial dependent relationship and a step 
towards a more interdependent, equitable relationship with Europe7 . 
The Conventions, therefore, were due to bring about a number of important benefits and 
namely: 
• a growing equality between the North and South countries;  
• a greater interdependence of ACPs countries;  
• a furthering of economic development and multilateral international ties for ACP 
countries and away from dependence on the old colonial power; 
As far as the Lomè relationships are concerned, two major aspects have been emphasized 
(see Brown, 2002). 
• First, the existence of interdependence is asserted in the mere fact of ‘co-operation’ 
between states, as an attempt to define the mutual interests of each party in the 
agreements and in the growth of new multilateral channels of connectedness between 
states. A as a result, we assisted at a widening of relationships in two ways: in the move 
away from bilateral ties of the colonial era towards multilateral ties between two groups 
of countries; and in the expansion of the issue areas covered in the relationship – from 
imperial economic linkages to issues of aid, economic support, political dialogue and 
regional politics. 
• Second, the assertion of the possibility, or actuality, of growing equality between the 
two groups of states. This was interpreted as a result of the growth of complexity in the 
economic field and linked the international manifestations of interdependence to the 
modernisation of developing countries. Basically, weak states could move from a 
                                                 
7 In a nutshell, these approaches argued that while the international system may or may not be characterised 
by anarchy (in the sense of the absence of a supranational organization above nation-states), nevertheless 
substantial areas exist for co-operation between states in the pursuit of mutual gains. These may exist in any 
arena of international relations, but are particularly apparent in attempts to govern the economic relations 
between states where joint agreements about standards and rules have proliferated, representing a substantial 
proportion of the range of multilateral arrangement that exist. The existence of regimes of rules and 
procedures help to lessen transaction costs, thus facilitating the trans-national spread of networks of 
interdependence (see Brown, 2002). 
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situation of dependency on a single power to a fully integrated set of relations with a 
multitude of powers. 
The achievement of economic take-off by the developing countries would therefore also 
means a greater level of integration and diversification in external economic relations and 
foreign policies. 
There are really two claims made within this approach to the Lomè Conventions: 
• an argument, which however has been later challenged, that they represent a step 
towards greater equality;  
• an argument that Lomè Conventions have to be understood as a regime and therefore 
should be placed within the wider context of regimes and international co-operation. 
As such they have: 
o   rules governing trade relations between the two groups of states; 
o  procedures for allocating aid and renegotiating the terms of the agreement; 
o  institutional aspects in the shape of joint committees of ministers and political 
representatives; 
o  a functional role both in a general sense of promoting ‘development’ and in the 
more basic but important sense of regulating economic interactions.  
 
3.2.2   The Dependency view 
 
The alternative view, which developed in the early debate on Lomè, drew a rather different 
picture (see Hoogvelt, 1982).  
In place of mutual vulnerabilities and growing interdependence, many observed a 
continuation of colonial-type patterns of economic relations. Domination  by others means 
that the Convention was a new mechanism mostly economic of dominance and control 
(Amin 1976). Dependency theory argues, in fact, that contrary to expectations of growing 
equality between states and increasing development of the Third World countries, there 
was in fact a process of underdevelopment of the Third World countries by the 
industrialised nations (see Brown, 2002, p. 8). 
Dependency theory postulated a bifurcated world divided between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ 
areas, with a conflict of interests based on economic exploitation of the periphery by the 
core, rather than co-operation as the basis of the global system. From this perspective 
Lomè reinforced a dependent relationship, through an emphasis on primary product 
exports to Europe from Africa, through a lack of promotion on industrialisation in Africa 
and through promoting a reliance on financial support from colonial masters. 
Lomè was also seen to foster dependency through its claimed effects on African unity or 
prospects for pan-African regionalism. Attempts at African regional union were thwarted 
by the preponderance of ‘extroverted’ links to Europe (Luke, 1985). Such vertical linkages 
were particularly marked in the more developed African countries and thus exacerbated the 
problem, as these countries, with the closest link s to Europe, were often the very ones at 
the centre of regionalist ventures8. 
A last element that reinforces the dependency perspective is seen in relation to the relative 
structural positions of Africa and Europe in the world economy. Clearly within the Lomè 
context the Convention is seen to perpetuate this dependent relationship by maintaining 
the links to the ‘metropole’ that ensure development remains blocked. 
                                                 
8 see Olofin, (1977) regarding the experience of ECOWAS and Custom Union Arrangements. 
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3.3 The EU-ACP co-operation in perspective 
 
Broadly speaking, the EU policy towards developing countries can be defined ‘a European 
response’ to the core demands of the Third World during the late 1950s onwards.  
To completely recompose the web of EU development countries ties established over the 
years, one should analyse the debate within the Community about development 
perspective, policies and practices. These, however, are poorly documented in the official 
EU publications9.  
During the Lome’s lifetime, in fact, the Commission simply posited that the Conventions 
should be taken at face value: as a joint agreement between sovereign states on the basis of 
equality with the aim of furthering the development of ACPs states. 
Lomè was proclaimed as the most extensive co-operation agreement of the history of 
North-South relations covering trade, aid, joint management and funding for a wide range 
of development actions, their effects are mainly seen in terms of development ‘benefit’ for 
the ACP states.  
The outcome of the cooperation for the EU states is more often than not neglected.  
As pointed out by a few commentators (see Lister 1988, Brown, 2002, Grilli, 1993), after 
more than four decades of EEC development policy, one may declare that the Community 
system of development cooperation and all its political and economic offshoots as they 
have developed hitherto have been disappointing and failed to meet the needs of the poor 
southern states. 
The positive results have been limited to a number of isolated cases (see Pons Grau, 1993). 
Despite the acknowledged failures, the Community has never abandoned, nor revised its 
approach to development based on Eurocentric theories (Mehmet, 1985). 
One can rightly wonder whether the efforts of the Community have been really genuine 
and recognize that a new asset of North-South relationships has been created or posit, 
instead, that these relationships simply reflect the asymmetries and unequal socioeconomic 
capabilities distinguishing the developed and underdeveloped counties in a world context. 
Far from having the presumption to answer this question, it can be worth however making 
an effort to state the question more clearly. To this end we recall four main interpretive 
approaches to the EU-ACP cooperation, which have been put forward in the literature, and 
discuss them in the light of the concepts we elaborated in Section 2, see Tab. 2 
 
3.3.1   The modernization approach 
 
This represents the official interpretation of the Community. It is also the interpretation 
which most explicitly draws from the earlier consolidated view of the liberal approach 
hinted in 3.2.1.  
In accordance with that view, the main purpose of the EU-ACP cooperation is to meet an 
encompassing need for international solidarity. Though cooperation, in fact a greater 
interdependence is achieved which can be greatly beneficial for the economic development 
of the ACP partners. 
Community has established a relation on the basis of a complete equality between the 
partners and in a spirit of international solidarity and this is understood as the most 
necessary and sufficient condition for cooperation to exist. 
                                                 
9 The official publications of the EU Commission rarely deal with the politics of the changing international 
political economy in which this particular set of relations is set. They thus fail to grasp important elements of 
the reasons for, the dynamics of the change of, and the constrains on, development co-operation policy in the 
Lomè Convention (see Brown, 2002). 
  
 
19 
CONTRIBUTI DI RICERCA
Table 2     A comparison of the main interpretations of the role of the Community in the EU-ACP 
relationships 
 Modernization Neo-dependency Collective clientelism State interest 
Purpose 
Broad aim of 
international 
solidarity 
Maintenance of 
colonialist relationships
Partner protection 
for market volatility 
Protection of donor 
interests 
Outcome 
Greater 
interdependence for 
promoting economic 
development 
Asymmetrical 
economic exploitations
Market conditioned 
economic exchanges 
Selfish economic 
exploitations  
Agreement Partnership among sovereign states 
Formal arrangement to 
maintain the core-
periphery dependency 
Arrangement to 
maintain cliental ties 
between unequal 
actors 
Arrangement to off 
load some donor 
partners 
Decision-
making  Coordinated 
Independent / 
conditional 
Independent / 
conditional 
Negotiated, 
competitive 
 
 
The various changes, which have been introduced, are claimed to be ‘neutral’, ‘apolitical’ 
and ‘technical’ in nature and intended to achieve more effective development cooperation 
in the interests of ACPs countries. EU interests and policy agendas are not seen to be the 
main driving force behind the modification introduced. Even the introduction of funding 
for structural adjustment was presented as a Community response to a developmental need 
in the ACPs states, and the shift in many areas of the Convention to an emphasis on 
encouraging the private sector, reducing the role of the state and, more recently, of 
reforming the state itself, are also presented as enhancing the possibility of development. 
This school of thought neglects to acknowledge the existence of a changing environment: 
the underlying politics of the Convention, the politics of the changing international political 
economy in which this particular set of relations is set, and political and economic agendas 
other than concern for ‘development cooperation’ which may exist in EU policy. 
The literature shares a failing of an absence of critical awareness of the historical, social, 
economic and political contexts in which this institutionalised relationship has evolved. 
 
3.3.2   The neo-dependency approach 
 
This approach provides a diametrically opposed view. As mentioned in 3.2.2 this 
postulated a bifurcated world divided between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ areas, with a conflict 
of interests based on economic exploitation of the periphery by the core. 
Community’s policy is mainly viewed as a ‘symbolic innovation’, which however does not 
substantially change the structure of colonial-type relationships existing between poor and 
rich countries. The EU-ACP relationships, therefore, are mainly interpreted as neo-
colonial10. 
                                                 
10”In accord with the definition given by the dictionary of Politics: ‘ …the conditions of poor countries are 
often no better and their peoples no freer than when they were governed by the European Colonial powers in 
the period up to the mid 20th century’. This statement is confirmed by the first leader of Ghana that after the 
independence of his country wrote: ‘the essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in 
theory, independent and has all the trappings of international sovereignty. In reality, its economic system and 
its political policy is directed by outside’. 
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The main purpose of Community is the maintenance of a relationship forged in the 
colonial era and which the intervention of political independence has done little to alter. 
Furthermore, the Community itself chooses the development path and it is not a result of a 
joint-effort. 
In this context, the Lomè Conventions reinforced a dependent relationship, through an 
emphasis on primary product exports to Europe from Africa, through a lack of promotion 
of industrialisation in Africa and through promoting a reliance on financial support from 
former colonial masters. 
The Conventions, therefore, are seen to encourage the continuation of inequality by giving 
support to primary exports through the Stabex system, not allowing enough market access 
for manufactured exports to the EU from the ACP, and not financing industrialisation 
through aid provisions. 
Lomè was also seen to foster dependency through its claimed effects on African unity or 
prospects for pan-African regionalism. 
 
3.3.3   The collective-clientelism approach 
 
A third and more recent interpretation (see Moss and Ravenhill, 1982) is that of ‘collective 
clientelism’. This views the relationships between the Community and the Third World 
countries as an agreement between unequal parties, but where the dependent one is eager 
for the agreement. For this approach, in fact, the ACPs countries are aware that they are 
weak, even as compared with other low developed countries and NICs (Newly 
Industrialised Countries) but try to draw advantages from the dialectics of dependence. 
They try to exploit the current state of affairs of dependence and the special, historically 
evolved, relations in order to maintain resources as a means to ease independence. The 
cliental system offers the weaker partner the special chance of turning a weakness into 
strength, i.e. of drawing greater benefits from cooperation. 
Collective clienteles offer the weaker partner protection from market volatility. It is an 
asymmetric relationship, which can only exist between actors with unequal resource 
distribution. The relationship is furthermore characterised by a packet of ‘affective ties’ and 
instrumental involved in a rational cliental relationship with the EU. For most countries, 
the Lomè Agreements provide the possibility of acquiring material benefits. The EU on the 
other hand shows an interest in vertical cooperation, since it considered the ACPs states as 
allies in the West-East conflict, in international debates and in intra-capitalistic competition, 
as well as means to securing raw material supplies. 
 
3.3.4   The state-interest approach 
 
The final and most recent approach to the EU-ACPs relationships focuses on the self-
interests of the European states (see Lister 1988). Some commentators (Brown 2002) have 
argued that ‘donor interests’ dominate the use of aid over ‘recipient interests’, ensuring that 
the self-interests of the European Union countries are carried through into the delivery of 
aid. 
Others have focussed specifically on French interests in the foundation of Lomè and in its 
use of aid. Among all the European states it is France, which has always had the greatest 
commitment to the relationship with the ACPs. In particular, the Conventions have been 
seen as a means by which France was able to off-load to its European partners some of the 
costs of maintaining this African relationship. They are also important to France’s middle-
power status, thus emphasising the ‘power-politics’ origins of apparent cooperation.  
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The emphasis on the pursuit of selfish interests, however, exposes the same kind of 
problem to that left by the neo-dependency approach: why would the southern states 
participate if donor interests are so dominant and given that there is no direct or indirect 
coercion to participate in the agreements? 
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS: COOPERATION VS COOPERATIVE 
ACTIONS 
 
 
Far from being exhaustive, from our overview a kind of blurred picture of EU 
development cooperation emerges. This, however, spurs for a quest to a general 
improvement in future programs. 
Besides the opportunity to critically analyse the unsatisfactory outcome of the programs 
carried out in the past, there is also a need to fully account for the current societal, 
technological and geo-political changes. 
To briefly discuss the argument, these changes can be organized under three main headings 
which, to some extent, can be considered as major drives to cooperation in the next 
decade, see Fig. 2: 
• a re-definition of the developmental issues which EU-ACP cooperation programs 
should focus on; 
• the contrasting trends of decentralization and globalization whose impact on the geo-
political and institutional assets of countries is changing the conditions of cooperation; 
• new ways of thinking about and approaching the definition of cooperative actions and 
their implications on the building and managing of human organizations in general. 
 
 
Figure 2   Major drives for cooperative actions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A twofold observation can be put forward: 
• first that these drives widen the scopes of cooperation programs, i.e. they diversify and 
at the same time extend the goals of cooperation, therefore enriching the types of 
relationships which should be established among the partners; 
• and second that they involve to a greater extent sub-national local governments and 
non-governmental bodies of the EC and non-EC states. As the number of eligible 
partners increases, also the kind of formal agreements should diversify in order to best 
respond to their targets.  
A general implication is that the potentials of cooperation are likely to be significantly 
expanded and be relevant not only for the relationships between the North–South, EU-ACP 
Improving 
cooperative 
actions
Developmental 
issues
Institutional setting: 
decentralization 
and globalizaztion
Learning about 
cooperation
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countries, but also, more generally, for the encompassing relationships between the so 
called core and peripheral areas within and between EU states. 
 
 
4.1 Development issues and cooperation goals: redefining common interests  
 
The evolution of the Conventions taken into consideration in this paper has demonstrated 
the complexity and problematic nature of such formalised relations between groups of 
states in a rapidly changing international environment. 
The concept of partnership has been questioned throughout the paper. One major result of 
our analysis is that partnership cannot be assumed to exist simply because a contract has 
been signed, it needs to be achieved rather than declared.  
In particular, the discussion in Section 3 suggests that cooperation agreements were based 
on too many assumptions about the very nature of the aims of cooperation: 
• that there was a common vision underlying the shared objectives and interests. This 
assumed but rarely questioned or evaluated; 
• that the context in which the cooperation initiatives took place did not change. As a 
consequence, they largely failed to adjust to the major changes in the international 
policy environment (such as shifting views on the role of the state, participation of 
non-state actors) and to the new requirements of development cooperation 
(governance, accountability and transparency). 
The process of definition of the goals of cooperation therefore appears to be of paramount 
importance. In particular we contend that the viability of this process would require taking 
into account both the changes in the institutional context (i.e. those produced by 
decentralization and globalisation) and learning about cooperation. 
 
 
4.2 The impact of decentralization and globalization  
 
Decentralization and globalization are two contrasting trends of change that will further 
severely affect the future development cooperation programs. 
The former reflects the worldwide thrust of political liberalisation, the changing 
perceptions on the role of the nation-state in development and a search for alternative 
channels to cooperate. It is seen as a step towards greater involvement of ‘the people’ 
directly concerned by development programmers and a tool for the creation of a 
democratic fabric. 
The latter is the process of creating an integrated global economy, polity and society. It 
provides a broader arena in which actors are compelled to perform in. 
Although relatively recent11, decentralization has produced an increase in the number of the 
agents involved in partnerships. I.e. besides nation-states, other actors such as local 
governments and other non-governmental bodies are entitled to cooperate. As a 
consequence, a more heterogeneous environment for cooperative actions has been created. 
Direct support to civil society actors may bring development closer to the people enhance 
local ownership and accountability. Actively involving local actors is often seen to be the 
best investment in ‘capacity development’. 
                                                 
11 Decentralization in the context of cooperation has been developed in Lomè IV in the late eighties. 
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Its fundamental aim is to promote the active involvement of the European civic societies in 
developing effective actions (see the projects of the Piedmont Region12) 
The cornerstone of decentralised cooperation is the transfer of financial responsibilities to 
local actors, which prevents the central government is less able to interfere in the day-to-
day management of decentralised operations. 
Some distinctive basic features of the decentralised cooperation programmes are: 
• a different political approach that enhances the participatory development and the 
formation of interest groups;  
• the possibility to support initiatives that originate directly from the local communities 
and association. In this way the ‘top-down approach’ is avoided and the responsibility 
for programme identification and implementation is hence delegated to the lowest 
possible level; 
• the improvement of the ability to learn from the cooperation experiences, 
strengthening the capacity of civil society to formulate their own objectives and aims; 
• the augmentation of cooperation initiatives. Decentralized cooperation programmes, 
however, have to be seen as complementary actions and not in opposition to those 
undertaken by nation states.  
Globalization can influence the process of cooperation in many ways. So far the most 
evident are: 
• a greater role for the trade blocks, i.e. EU, NAFTA, Asia’s Tigers; 
• an erosion of bargaining power of weaker agents; 
• the greater influence of international financial institutions (WTO, IMF), through the 
Adjustment Structural Programmes. 
 
 
4.3 Learning about cooperation 
 
One major claim of this paper is that improving our understanding of cooperative actions 
is essential for the viability of cooperative initiatives also on an institutional ground.  
In this regard, the discussion in Section 2 attempted to organize in a conceptual framework 
some major features, which may support this understanding. In particular, it allowed us to 
show how some of the these features, notably those concerned with the agent’s cognitive 
abilities (which form the internal dimension of the framework), play an important role for 
the establishment of a so-called ‘genuine’ partnership, i.e. one which goes beyond the 
simple formal agreement. 
Underlying the discussion of the taxonomy of cooperation types, there is also the 
presumption that the acknowledgement of the increasing complexity that we can observe 
in many cooperative situations today, cannot help considering the kind of knowledge 
‘about the cooperation questions’ which is available to the involved actors. Following this 
line of argument, therefore, one may contend, perhaps naively, that the more ‘information’ 
there is about cooperation the more likely cooperation will be successful (i.e. achieve its 
goals, reinforce the capacity building of the weaker agents, use the allotted resources 
efficiently). 
The current debate about the measurement, monitoring and assessment of the 
performance of cooperation initiatives supports this claim (see Lehtinen, 2000, 
www.Paris21.org). Collecting data, gathering information about best practices and 
                                                 
12 For further information: Provincia di Torino “La cooperazione decentrata. Strumento di sviluppo dei 
poteri locali. 
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implementing indicators are ways of learning about the many facets of development 
cooperation programs and related developmental issues.  
As far as our conceptual framework is concerned, in particular, we can note that, as they 
are related to the representational function, this bundle of activities can also find a place in 
our conceptual framework, as far as   the agents’ cognitive abilities are concerned.  
A last comment worth being made here relates to the fact that cooperation in its broader 
meaning, i.e. as a dynamic situation of interacting individuals benefiting the group, which 
the individuals belong to, is becoming increasingly important for coping with the 
complexities in today system organizations. In fact, it can represent a viable alternative for 
overcoming the difficulties encountered by conventional approaches based on stereotyped 
juxtapositions such as those between state and market, individual and society, core and 
periphery. Also from an organizational point-of view, cooperative forms of relationships 
would provide useful alternative to deal with the management of functions and tasks at 
different levels (see Kooiman, 1994). This also reflects a more profound quest about the 
very roots of human sociality and the formation of social order as a result of the behaviour 
of purposive agents (see, Macy, 1998, Castelfranchi, 1998b, David, Sichman and Coelho, 
2001).   
On a more theoretical ground, in particular, to deepen an understanding of human 
cooperation, also by means of simulation experiments, can help answering a number of 
practical questions, such as those concerning (see Axelrod, 2000, Cohen, Riolo and 
Axelrod 1998, Zimmermann et al. 2000): 
• Under what conditions cooperation can be established and sustained in the long run? 
• What are kind of strategy should be implemented for an interaction situation to 
become cooperative? 
• What kind of recommendation can be suggested to the decision-maker (the reformer) 
in order to favour the emergence of cooperation? 
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